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PROBLEM OF PRIVATE CENSORSHIP 
Wendy J Gordon* 
First Amendment Protection (2) Authors' rights 
for Free Speech 4.06 D. Safeguarding Hostile Uses 
Is There Shelter for the from Suppression: A Search for 
Necessary Freedom to Borrow Converging Policies 
ih the Idea-Expression (1) The economics of suppression 
Dichotomy? 4.25 (2) Authors' rights and suppression 
C. Identifying Relevant Principles (3) Reference to analogues in the 
common law and Policies 4.31 







Copyright policy must resolve intelligently the tension between upstream 4.01 
and downstream creators, between incentives to create and incentives to use. 
Downstream at1thors who copy and transform others' images or words as 
an input to new creativity have. obvious free speech concerns. So do simple 
copiers in those many instances where even non-creative copying is essential 
for expressing one's ideas or allegiances. 
Part of the tension is economic. Because virtually every author :needs access 4.02 
to predecessor texts, a legislature that increases copyright protection for 
·today's creators simultaneously increases tomorrow's costs of creation 1 or use .. 
But the issue goes far beyond mere pricing and output. 
* Copyright © 2005 Wendy J Gordon. I thank Gary Lawson, Mike Meurer, Neil Netanel, 
and Rebecca Tushnet for their comments, and Brandon Ress for his research assistance. 
1 WM Landes and RA Posner, 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law' (1989) 18 J Legal 
Studies 325~3. · 
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4.03 All exclusive rights impose restraints on the behaviour of fellow citizens.2 
This is true not only of rights enforceable by injunction; the law typically 
enforces even·rights to·receive money, such as compulsory licence provisions,3 
by criminal sanctions and the courts' contempt power, leading at the extreme 
to imprisonment for users who refuse to pay. Therefore, like all privately-held . 
rights, copyright empowers a private person4 (including juridical persons such 
as corporations) to impose restraints on liberty. 
4.04 Moreover, since copyright subsists in work of expression, it has great poten-
tial for restraining liberties of speech. In particular, copyright can empower 
a private party to censor criticism or ridicule to which his works might 
otherwise be subject, or to limit how copies of his work are used. Criticism 
often needs to replicate part of its target's content in order to illustrate for 
the audience the flaws perceived. If copyright is too strong, however, the law 
can strip the critic of his or her ability to reproduce crucial evidence. 5 
2 For every exclusive right in the law, there is ( definitionally) a corresponding duty. 
Persons subject to a duty are (definitionally) not at liberty to disregard it. See generally WN 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal 
Essays, ed W Cook (1923); WN Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning' (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16. . 
3 It is easy to overstate the differences between 'liability rule' protection (money only) 
and 'property rule' protection (injunctive power given to private owner). For the origins 
of the locution, see G Calabresi and AD Mdamed, 'Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral' (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-128. 
4 Governments can also own copyrights under US law, except for works created by federal 
employees within the scope of their employment. 17 USC, s 105. Thus, for example, some 
cases involve copyright claims by local municipalities. This chapter focuses on private rather 
than governmental copyright owners. However of course a First Amendment defence .should 
be available a fortiori when the plaintiff is a governmental entity. 
5 The courts in the US do sometimes recognize the importance of copyrighted work as 
'evidence' in public debate. In Nunez the publicly debated question was whether the copy-
righted photograph of a near-naked beauty queen should deprive her of her crown, and the 
media reproduction of the photograph was upheld as fair use. Nunez v Caribbean Intern News 
Corp 235 F 3d 18 CA l (Puerto Rico), 2000. Similarly, some courts seem t~ be sensitive to the 
way that created works, once integrated into the culture, can become facts of life with which 
the defendant and.her audience need to engage. See.SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co 268 
F 3d 1257 (11th Cir 2001) (reversing on fair use grounds a preliminary injunction against a 
. novel parodying and criticizing the American classic; Gone With The Wind). However, under 
most current interpretations· of doctrine, such uses can be defeated if the other factors in the 
fair use calculus so indicate. · 
Evidence in public debate is, further, only a subset of a larger class: all those instances in 
which the copyrighted work is reproduced because its existence as a fact is what makes it 
important to the defendant. 
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Similarly, people need symbols and texts that they mutually recognize, and 
for copyright to deprive the public of the ability to use symbols in the 
contexts they prefer can distort their ability to inform and reform culture in 
which they live. 6 The question is how the law should reply to such attempts 
at private censorship. 
In the USA, the federal Constitution emp~wers Congress 'To promote the 4.05 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings arid Dis-
coveries'. 7 The Constitution also, in its First Amendment, invalidates laws 
that restrain free speech.8 The question then becomes how the Amendment 
limits either Congress's power to enact copyright legislation, or courts' inter-
pretation and implementation of ~e legislation. If that Amendment is 
· unavailable, then the focus needs to shift to what other protections the law 
contains for free speech. This chapter will address the First Amendment issue 
first, and then explore alternative avenues for shelter. 
A. First Amendment Protection for Free Speech 
In regard to First Amendment doctrine, three kinds of. cases should be 4.06 
roughly distinguished: cases using the First Amendment to challenge legisla-
tion in which Congress uses copyright to take sides in a religious or ideo-
logical dispute; cases using the First Amendment to challenge legislation in 
which Congress amends the copyright statute in a general way that neverthe-
less affects speech; and c~es that do not raise . facial challenges to copyright 
legislation, but rather seek to use the First Amendment against particular 
claims of copyright infringement. The term 'private censorship' applies to 
this last group of cases. In this last class, defendants either seek to assert 
an· explicit First Amendment defence, or seek to persuade courts that they 
can avoid conflicts with the First Amendment only by interpreting existing 
6 See generally Jack M Balkin, 'Digital Speech And Democratic Culture: A Theory Of 
Freedom Of Expression For The Information Society', 79 NYU L Rev 1 (2004);' Rosemary 
Coombe, The Cultural Life of lntellec'tual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law 
(Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1998). 
7 US Const, Art I, s 8, cl 8. 
8 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or · of the press', 
US Const Amendment I. 
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provisions of copyright law (such as the fair use doctrine or the non-ownable 
status of ideas and facts) in a broad, pro-liberty fashion. 
4.07 Most obviously vulnerable to challenge on First Amendment grounds is 
legislation in the first group, namely, copyright laws through which the gov-
ernment seeks to favour one speaker or viewpoint over another. One such 
case (and they are rare) involved the writings of Mary Baker Eddy, founder of 
Christian Science. When a split in the Christian Science Church arose, the 
branch of the Church that owned copyright in Eddy's work asked Congress 
for private legislation to extend or restore Eddy's copyrights, as a means to 
prevent variant editions by believers who disagreed doctrinally with the 
majority group. 'Church witnesses supporting enactment of [the] Private 
Law ... frankly admitted that their distress over variant editions was reli-
giously motivated', 9 and Congress was persuaded to extend the copyrights 
by enacting the requested Private Law. The courts struck the Private Law 
down as unconstitutional, on the ground that Congress had 'lent the Church 
leadership the assistance vital to shaping the beliefs of lay worshipers'. To my 
knowledge, this is the only piece of copyright legislation struck down on First .· 
Amendment grounds, and even there the court based its decision on the 
Amendment's 'free establishment' clause rather than on the 'free speech' 
clause.10 
4.08 A second class of cases involves challenges to generally oriented provisions of 
the copyright statute-provisions that do not take sides in ideological or 
religious controversies, but nevertheless have the potential to distort public 
communications and debate~ The Eldred challenge to the Sonny Bono Act's 
extension of copyright term is one such case, and a key issue in such cases is 
the level of scrutiny to which the Court should subject the statutes at issue.11 
4.09 The third class of cases, the area of 'private censorship', involves the desire 
of individual defendants to use free speech as a defence to a particular 
charge of copyright infringement, either explicitly or to give force to other 
9 United Christian Scientists v Christian Science Board Of Directors, First Church Of Christ, 
ScientistB29 F 2d 1152 (DC Cir 1987). 
10 Ibid. Note, however, that the opinion in passing mentions both 'speech and religious' 
issues, and it is hard to imagine that the court would have come out any differently had it 
rested explicitly and solely on free speech grounds. 
11 Eldred v Ashcroft 537 US 186 (2003). See the extensive discussion of Eldred in ch 6 
below. 
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doctrines such as fair use. Explicit First Amendment defences have almost 
. never been allowed, and even First Amendment influence is sometimes 
resisted; 12 ordinarily the courts act as if the traditional fair use doctrine and 
the dichotomy between ownable expression and non-ownable ideas and facts 
provided such sufficient shelter for free speech that the constitutional issue 
need not be reached. Yet many sad. proofs exist that conventional doctrine 
fails in this regard. 
One such case ironically parallels the Christian Science example. A splinter 4.10 
church begun by former ministers. in the Worldwide Church of God sought 
to reproduce an unexpurgated version of the writings penned by the founder ·. 
of both churches. The writings at issue were protected by generally applicable 
copyright (rather than by a Private Act in which Congress took sides in the 
dispute). The majority church disapproved of the unexpurgated original, 
and had solely issued a revised edition. The court refused · to shelter the 
dissidents' reproduction under fair use, not seeing that the defendants' use 
of the scriptures was essentially factual, as providing the dissidents' best 
evidence for proper belie£ 13 In such cases,. one person's exclusive right under 
copyright conflicts with-and is enforced over-another person's desire to 
write, paint, sing, proselytize, or otherwise 'speak' in ways that employ the 
symbols and expression of his culture. · 
This third class of cases is difficult in part because the First Amendment 4.11 
prohibits government from abridging free speech, and copyright plaintiffs 
are not government actors .. Although much American scholarship questions 
how sharp a divide really exists between 'private action' and 'state action', 
a divide between public and private still informs much jurisprudence: 
American lawyers usually think of the federal and state constitutions as 
12 Thus, Judge Posner writes: 
'Copyright law and the principles of equitable relief are quite complicated enough with-
out the superimposition of First Ame11dment case law on them; and we have been told 
recently by the Supreme Court not only that "copyright law contains built-in First 
Amendment accommodations" but also that, in any event, the First Amendment "bears 
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches." Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769, 788-89, (2003). Or, we add, to copy, or enable 
the copying of, other people's music.' · 
In re: Aimster CopyrightL#igation 334 F 3d 643 at 656 (7th Cir 2003). It is difficult, however, 
to know how to interpret his brief reference. 
13 Worldwide Church of God v Philadelphia Church of God, Inc 227 F 3d 1110 (9th Cir 
2000). 
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having the task of reining in abuses of governmental power, and usually think 
of federal arid state legislation as having the role of reining in abuse of private 
actors' wealth or strength. The notion of using the federal Constitution to 
rein in private actors' use of law fits uneasily in this scheme. Yet when 
a private person sues, he or she is using the government's own power. 
4.12 Private rights to sue have sometimes been recognized as sufficiently 
governmental action that the First Amendment applies to them.14 Thus, in 
defamation suits, Supreme Court case law allows newspaper reporters to 
draw on the First Amendment for shelter if they print false and injurious 
statements about a public official as a result of reasonable error. 15 Arguably a 
critic, historian, or other author who utilizes another's copyrighted expres-
sion for, for example, evidentiary purposes should be able to avail herself of 
similar free speech defences based in the First Amendment. 
4.13 . There are many reasons why the courts hold back from employing free speech 
analysis wholeheartedly in copyright cases. One contributing factor may be 
the interaction between the Supreme Court precedent on physical property 
and the familiar if controversial trope that treats copyright as 'property'16• 
Although some early US Supreme Court cases suggested that free speech 
could provide a defence to suits enforcing rights in land (as when a speaker 
sought access to the streets of a wholly-owned 'company town' to address its· 
residents), for ~any years now the Court has been reluctant to recognize.that 
property cases can implicate the First Amendment. Although that reluctance 
is probably ill-founded, it may play a role in the courts' reluctance to embrace 
the First Amendment wholeheartedly in copyright cases. There is ample 
14 Netanel points to helpful precedent in the areas such as trademark, right of publicity, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See para 6.08 below. · 
15 New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) holds that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect media false statements made about the official conduct of a public 
official, such that damages may be awarded only if'actual malice' is shown. When the plaintiff 
shows that the media defendant published the statement in reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity, that constitutes a sufficient showing of actual malice. 
16 Virtually a:ny right can be characterized as 'property' if it involves a right to forbid, a 
liberty to do, and a power to transfer. Yet the concerns of physical property law are inapplicable 
to many of the rights in intangibles'. 
I can suggest some alternative labels for the 'property' nomenclature in copyright. One is 
'transferable mini-monopoly', or the coined word, 'minopoly'. By 'mini' I mean to reflect that 
copyright is not a full monopoly: although copyright law prevents strangers from duplicating 
the copyrighted work, it is not necessarily accompanied by market power and does not prevent 
competition from similar but independently created works. 
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ground to distinguish physical property from copyright-for example, copy-
right governs behaviour in regard to patterns17 rather than things; for another, 
the infringing act in copyright law need not harm the plaintiff in the least, 
unlike the typical invasion or taking of physical property-yet the 'property' 
locution is so well-embedded in copyright practice that judges may fear that 
recognizing a First Amendment defence to copyright could erode physical 
property rights. 
Probably the most important factor is that American judges typically feel 4.14 
that the First Amendment commits them to a neutrality that discourages 
them from making distinctions based on the content of particular speech.18 
The value of one position or another is supposed to evolve through public 
debate, not through governmental fiat. How then can judges evaluate if 
disallowing a particular copyright suit-· to avoid imposing a burden on 
speech-would 'outweigh' the arguable loss of incentive, or the injury to the 
plaintiff's 'right to keep silent'? And ifjudges cannot weigh, would recogniz-
ing the First Amendment's applicability commit them to dismiss any copy-
right cause of action that has even the slightest impact on speech? The latter 
course would gut copyright, which is not a route the courts are willing to 
follow. 
In the defamation area, accommodations have been found for these desires to 4.15 
achieve neutrality while simultaneously protecting both free speech and the 
core of the private right of action. To accomplish· this, the courts employ 
a mixture of devices, primarily tests of factual falsity and recklessness: if a 
reporter prints something false with reckless disregard as to whether the 
statement about a public official was true or not, a court can feel comfortable 
imposing damages on him. A reporter's proven recklessness serves as a proxy 
for the low value of his contribution· to debate.· In copyright, by contrast, 
no similar proxy has been identified that can serve to substitute for direct 
evaluation of the worth of speech. 
These are some of the reasons why American courts vacillate when copyright 4.16 
confronts the First Amendment. Not long ago a federal court held that 
'copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First 
17 wj Gordon, Chapter 28: Intellectual Property Law, in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet 
(eds), Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 617-46. · 
18 This is one reason why European jurisdictions regulate 'hate speech' in ways that would 
be unthinkably direct for the USA. 
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Amendment' .19 The US Supreme Court then repudiated that harsh ruling.20 
The High Court acknowledged implicitly that sometimes each of us does 
have a Constitutional right under the First Amendment to employ the copy-
righted works of others.21 However, the Court treated that right as 'second-
class', 22 and upheld a copyright term extension without the kind of scrutiny 
that content-distorting legislation ordinarily receives. Wrote the Court, 'The 
First Amendment . . . bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to 
make other people's speeches. '23 Many Americans hope that US copyright 
law will be written and applied in a way that safeguards the public's interest 
in free speech, 24 but the aspiration remains to be realized. 
4.17 The question remains largely open elsewhere as well. Like the US Consti-
tution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights simultaneously recog-
nizes both a right to owri one's expression and a right of free speech. Thus, 
Article 27(2) provides support for patents and copyrights; It states that 'Every-
one has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.' 
Yet Article 19 states that 'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression' including 'freedom ... to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas'. Similarly, Article 27(1) states that 'Everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to 
share in scientific advancement and its benefits.' 
4.18 Both copyright on the one hand, and cultural participation and free speech 
· on the other, can serve goals of human flourishing. That both appear in the 
same documents is therefore unsurprising. But different means to the same· 
abstract end can conflict with each other. Which clause governs in the case of . 
a conflict?. The Declaration does not say. In the USA, by contrast, it is clear 
19 Eldred t1 Reno 239 F 3d 372 at 376 (US Ct of Apps (DCCir), 2001), reversed sub nom 
Eldredt1Ashcroft537 US 186 (2003). 
20 Wrote the Supreme Court, 'We recognize that the DC Circuit spoke too broadly when it 
declared copyrights "categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment".' 
Eldred t1 Ashcroft 537 US at 789-90. 
21 Ibid. . . 
22 D McGowan, 'Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy' [2004] 
. 65 U Pitt L R 281. 
23 537 US at 789-90. 
24 Thus, the Eldred Court noted: '[I]t is appropriate to construe copyright's internal safe-
guards to accommodate First Amendment concerns'. Ibid at n 24. Although the Court's 
suggestion was essentially rebuffed in Aimster Copyright Litigation 334 F 3d 643 at 656 
(7th Cir 2003), it may fare better in other contexts. 
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that free speech holds the trump card;25 although, as mentioned, there is 
often a lack of clarity as to when and how (and even if) the trump may be 
exercised in copyright cases. 
What besides the First Amendment_ could protect free speech in copyright 4.19 
law? Copyright law contains specific exemptions that sometimes can serve the 
interest of free discussion. In the USA, for example, these include provisions 
for library photocopying26 and the doctrines of 'first sale' or 'exhaustion' that 
allow for the circulation of used copies. 27 
Most nations also share some doctrines whose defining concepts are capable 4.20 
of flexible interpretation, such as the rule that copyright ownership does not 
extend to 'facts'. However, these are of uncertain reliability. For example, 
except when considering issues of computer interoperability, 28 most US 
courts persist in refusing to see that copyrighted works that usually function 
as expression sometimes can also function as facts. 29 Thus, in the Worldwid_e 
25 The First Amendment commands'-Congress 'shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press', US Const Amendment I-while the Constitution's copyright 
and patent clause merely authorizes Congress to enact copyright legislation, and does not 
. command it. US Const Art I, cl. 8. 
26 17 USC, s 108. 
27 Ibid, s 109. 
28 In: computer cases US courts have come to recognize the importance of allowing factual 
uses: as when the factual dominance of a particular copyrighted computer program will make 
some copying necessary for the purpose of achieving interoperability. Thus, defendants pre-
vailed in such cases as Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade, Inc 977 F 2d 1510 (9th Cir 1992) and 
Lotus Development Corp v Borland Int'l Inc 49 F 3d 807 (1st Cir 1995), afFd mem, 516 US 
233 (1996) (4-4 decision). Also see Computer Associates Int'l, Inc vAltai Inc982 F 2d 693, 710 
(2nd Cir 1992) (copyright does not extend to features of the program 'dictated by efficiency or 
external factors'). 
29 Some of this inability to see that our cultural landscape exists as a 'fact' is due to the 
all-or-nothing way in which the US statute frames the fact....:expression dichotomy. Facts 
cannot be 'owned' and are placed outside the protectable scope of copyrightable subject 
matter, 17 USC s 102(b), but the harder question is how to handle works of expression that 
sometimes act as facts and sometimes do not. 
Also important are Supreme Court dicta that posited a false dichotomy between works of 
authorship that are 'created,' and facts that are not 'created' but merely 'found', See, eg, ~ 
Gordon, 'Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use' (1992) 55 L & Contemporary Problems 
93-107 (arguing against the dicta of Feist that created works do indeed sometimes function as 
facts in the world, and arguing that special privileges should pertain in such cases). An analogy 
can be made to the way that the US law of evidence treats some statements as facts: US courts 
do ·not consider it 'hearsay' when wimesses quote statements made by third parties for a reason 
other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, when such a quotation is offered for 
· the purpose of proving some other matter (such as the hearer's state of mind), the witness can 
repeat the statemem made by another person without that 'copying' being hearsay. 
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Church of God case, mentioned earlier, worshipers wanted to rety upon what 
they considered the authoritative version of their scripture as their best and 
perhaps only evidence of correct belie£ Yet in empowering the majority 
faction of the church to curtail. this liberty, the court saw the non-ownership 
of facts as· irrelevant. 30 
4.21 Other doctrines with some flexibility are the requirement that the plaintiff 
prove that the amount the defendant copied was 'substantial' enough to be 
wrongful, and the rule that 'expression' but not 'ideas' can be o~ned. But the 
elasticity of these concepts is limited, as is suggested below in the discussion 
on the idea---expression dichotomy. 
4.22 A more fruitful avenue is the adoption of flexible, equitable doctrines ( either 
as· defences or as limitations on the copyright owner's prima facie rights) that 
allow explicit reference to the public interest. For example, nations with 
independent judiciaries should supplement the specific statutory exemptions 
with such defences as an expanded 'fair use'31 and 'fair dealing' defence, or a 
30 Worldwide Church of God· v Philadelphia Church of God, Inc 227 F 3d 1110 (9th Cir 
2000) (enforcing the copyright owned by a. dominant church group against the effort of a 
splinter group to reproduce the unexpurgated version of their founder's writings). The racist 
nature of the works the defendants wanted to reproduce may have played a role in the court's 
decision. 
31 A judicially devdoped doctrine that retains its flexibility, 'fair U:se' now appears in the 
copyright statute at 17 USC, s 107. That provision reads as follows: 
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use . 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in· copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use niade of a work in any 
particular cas~ is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
( 1} the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the riature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) · the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
· work as a whole; and 
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding 
is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
Note that the statutory section on fair use singles out 'criticism and comment' as deserving 
of solicitude, and parody as a form of criticism has long been considered an important exercise 
of fair use. 
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'free speech' defence-that can allow individualized, case-by-case accommo-
dation. Such defences are needed both in litigation involving traditional 
copyright infringement (roughly, 'copying' cases) and where a defendant is 
accused of bypassing encryption to reveal copyrighted material (roughly, 
'access' cases). No nation has a fully available 'fair use' defence; even the USA 
disallows use of the defence in cases charging bypass of encryption devices, 32 
and many US courts, even in copying cases implicating free speech issues, 
will refuse to employ the fair use defence in the face of strong substitutionary 
harm. 
In the Aristotelian sense, equity is a means of correcting for the law's in- 4.23 
evitable over-inclusiveness. 33 The purpose and justification of such flexible 
doctrines is usually that they allow the judge or other decision maker 'to say . 
what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would 
have put into his law if he had known'.34 Free speech warrants the extra cost 
of individualized investigation. 
For reasons explored earlier, the First Amendment is unlikely to yield immedi- 4.24 
ate payoff today. The remainder of the chapter will explore other doctrinal 
sources for sheltering free speech. In particular, it will suggest that the idea-
expression dichotomy is problematic, but that the very norms that justify 
The Supreme Court has indicated that, at least in cases of parody, a factor weighing in 
favour of a defendant receiving fair use treatment is a copyright owner's unwillingness to 
license an attack on its property. Where there is no licensing market, there may be an absence 
of harm from giving fair use. Thus the Court wrote: 
The mark~t for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original 
works would in general develop or license others to. develop. Yet the unlikelihood that 
creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews, or lampoons of their own 
productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market. 
CampbellvAcuff-RoseMusic, Inc, 510 US 569 at 592 (1994). 
For general discussion of fair use and an unwillingness of plaintiffs to license, see WJ 
Gordon, 'Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case 
and its Predecessors' (1982) 82 Columbia L Rev 1600; also see WJ Gordon, 'Excuse and 
Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the 
Story' (2003) 13 J Copyright Society 149 (Fiftieth Anniversary Issue). 
32 Digital Millenium Copyright Act, codified as amended at 17 USC§§ 1201-5. 
33 Aristotle writes, 'When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is 
not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has 
erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission.' Aristotle, '10 Ethics', in D Ross trans, JL 
Ackrill and JO Urmson, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1984), 133. 
34 Ibid. 
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copyright can be referenced as sources to flesh out flexible doctrines, such as 
fair use, in a way that furthers free speech goals. 35 
B. Is There Shelter for the Necessary Freedom to Borrow 
in the. Idea-Expression Dichotomy? 
4.25 A primary tool for accommodating the interests of new generations who wish 
to criticize their predecessors is the doctrine that while expression can be 
owned, ideas remain free for all to borrow. The doctrine, often known as the 
idea-"expression dichotomy, is adopted by most copyright systems as a mode 
of keeping the social costs of the copyright m.onopoly low. Someone who 
wishes to quote, but is unable or unwilling to pay the requisite price, is en-
titled to restate the underlying idea in her own words. The dichotomy seeks 
to assure that the fundamental building blocks of creation can be used freely, 
with no need to seek out and bargain with the party who placed the idea in the 
stream of culture. But it is fat from clear that courts today are using the 
doctrine to safeguard this necessary freedom with the requisite vigilance. 
4.26 The line between 'ideas' and 'expression' is, not surprisingly, a hazy one, and 
should a new artist happen to cross the line,· he will be guilty of creating an 
unauthorized derivative work. Further, sometimes ideas and expression are 
inextricably linked. Scholars such· as Richard Lanham suggest that this is the 
rule rather than the exception; they view the purported independence of 
message from mode of expression as largely an illusion.36 Thus, James Joyce's 
35 See WJ Gordon, 'Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the 
Problem of Private Censorship', 57 U Chicago L Rev 1009--49 (review essay, 1990). Some of 
the material in Section B and following is indebted to that early essay. 
36 Richard · Lanham, Analyzing Prose (2nd edn, Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2003). Also see Stanley Fish, Rhetoric, in Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin 
(eds), Critical Terms For Literary Study 203 (Chicago: U Chicago Press, 1990). On one oc-
casion; even the US Supreme Court recognized this, although not in a copyright context. 
When a young man was arrested for displaying the words 'Fuck the Draft' in a public building, 
the Court ruled that the First Amendment freed him. The defendant could have found other 
words to express the idea, yet, as the Court noted, '[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual 
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached 
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as 
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Consti~ 
tution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for 
that emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of 
the overall message sought to be communicated.' Cohen v California403 US 15, 26 (1971). 
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work deeply questioned 'copyright's notion that ideas and facts are anterior. 
to their particular expressions, and thus separable' ;37 he doubted ideas and 
facts could 'yield[] to paraphrase, transmissible without either disfigurement 
or infringement'.38 
Yet, art sometimes requires the use of predecessors' work, whether the use is 4.27 
hostile (as discussed by Harold Bloom)39 or grateful (as discussed by Lewis 
Hyde).40 The author of a new work is unlikely to obtain permission from a 
prior author if he wishes to criticize the prior work or use the prior author's 
material in a way that rejects or undercu.ts the meaning the predecessor meant 
to invest in her matedals or symbols. It may be precisely the travesty that is 
most in the need of freedom.41 · 
It is true that 'creative misprision' can often proceed without infringing a 4.28 
prior work. But that is not always the case. For example, central to the post-
modernist movement in art is commenting on existing culture~ often by 
employing the specific icons and images others have popularized.42 Whether· 
the art at issue is a photo-collage showing the Statue of Liberty swimming for 
her freedom,43 a retelling of Hamlet from the point of view of its minor 
characters,44 or a collocation by Picasso that pastes copyrighted textiles onto 
Such recognition is rare for copyright courts. And one can understand why: the more 
sensitively the courts recognize how restraining the copying of words can also restrain the 
substance of communication, the more the courts will need to develop a new jurisprudence if 
much is to be preserved of copyright. This development will hopefully occur, but has not yet. 
37 P K Saint-Amour, The Copywtights: Intellectua!Property and the Literary Imagination 
(Cornell, 2003) 189 (discussing the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode in Joyce's Ulysses). 
38 Ibid. . . 
39 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry {2nd edn, Oxford: OUP, 
1997). 
40 Lewis Hyde, The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property (Vintage, 1983). 
41 Compare T Stoppard, Travesties (Grove Press, 1975) 85-7. 
42 'The referent in post-Modern art is no longer 'nature,' but the closed system of fabricated 
signs that make up our environment.' John Carlin, 'Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation 
and Intellectual Property Law' (1988) 13 Columbia-VI.A J Land the Arts 103, 111. Carlin 
argues that 'some arrangement needs to be developed whereby artists' traditional freedom to 
depict .the environment in which they live and work is upheld' (ibid 140-1). The art form 
known as 'appropriation' makes an audience see pre-existing art in a new light or take a 
different stance towards it. Sometimes appropriation art involves making substantial changes 
in the pre-existing artwork; sometimes it does not. See generally, ibid. 
43 As in M Langenstein's 'Swimmer of Liberty,' pictured in Latman, Gorman,.and Gins~ 
burg, Copyright for the Nineties at 159. {Note I merely speculate about the reasons for Ms · 
Liberty's dip). · 
44 As in T Stoppard's Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead (Grove Press, 1967). 
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canvas, 45 much art might not be created if consent were required from the 
person whose work is being commented on. More generally, an artist or 
speaker sometimes needs to use the expressions, symbols, and.characters that 
represent what he is attempting to rebut, integrate, or criticize in order to 
make his point clearly. In American doctrine, 'fair use' gives its strongest 
shelter to. transformative uses, but uses that simply take and use symbols 
created by others can also have profound free speech implications.46 Thus, in 
holding that the State may not criminally prosecute someone for burning a · 
flag in political protest,47 even the US Supreme Court has recognized that it 
can be essential to self-expression to make hostile use of symbols originated 
by others. 48 
4.29 We are social creatures, and there are many symbols less noble than the flag 
that have a power over our minds. As the Court observed, 'Symbolism is a 
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas . . . a short cut from 
mind to mind. Causes and nations ... and ... groups seek to knit the loyalty 
of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. '49 Advertisers and 
entertainment conglomerates also seek to knit loyalty through the use of 
symbols. To free one's self or one's neighbours from an unqu~stioning 
loyalty, or simply to retain cultural vitality, it is sometimes necessary to use a 
45 The derivative work right, 17 USC section 106(2), has sometimes been extended to bar 
the reuse of legitimately puchased embodiments ofa copyrighted work. 
46 For example, consider a dissenting church that wishes to distribute copies of a copy-
righted 'scripture' that exactly duplicate the scripture's original form, but differ from the 
expurgated version preferred by the copyright holder. The free speech implications are clear, 
even though the dissenter wants to 'copy' rather than 'transform'. Nevertheless, in a case 
closely resembling this fact pattern, the copyright holder (the dominant portion of a divided 
church) was granted a judgment of copyright infringement against the dissenters. Worldwide 
Church of God v Philadelphia Church of God, Inc 227 F 3d 1110 (9th Cir 2000). The 
importance of non-transformative copying to free speech-and the sometimes inadequate 
shelter the fair use doctrine may provide it-is explored in Rebecca Tushnet, 'Copy This: How 
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves · It' ,_Yale LJ_{Essay, 
forthcoming). 
47 Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989): 
48 See Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989). If anyone originated the flag design, it was Betsy 
Ross. But the Court has difficulty seeing the issue when it is presented in the context of a so-
called intellectual property right. Thus, in The San Francisco Arts & Athleti.cs, Inc v United 
States Olympic Committee483 US 522 (1987), the Court held that the unauthorized use of the 
word 'Olympics' to promote the Gay Olympics, a non-profit athletic event, violated the US 
Olympic Committee's property right in the word. 
49 Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 at 405 (1989), quoting Wi-st Virginia Bd of Ed v Barnette 
319 us 624,632 (1943). 
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received symbol in an unexpected way, a way that the originators would 
not have wanted. ~o When the Disney organization successfully restrained a 
counter-cultural comic parody of Mickey Mouse that implicitly mocked 
both Disney and the suburban lifestyle legitimated in the Disney canon, 
one critic of the decision aptly commented: 'Prodigious success and its 
responsibilities and failures draws parody. That's how a culture defends itself. 
Especially from. institutions so large that they lose track of where they stop 
and the world begins so that they try to exercise their internal model of 
control on outside activities.,51 · 
How might these necessary freedoms be preserved? One answer is to apply 4.30 
the First Amendment as a defence where appropriate in particular cases, but 
so far the courts are resistant to that approach for reasons already intimated .. 
Another possibility is to look at the policies on which copyright itself is 
justified, and discover whether they contain natural 'limits, that would pre- · 
.vent their restraining important communicative activity. In prior work, I 
have argued that the public has a right to self-expression-a right to copy and 
adapt that can trump copyright in appropriate circumstances-based on the 
same justificatory claims that provide copyright's own normative founda-
. tions. Flexible doctrines such as fair use can and should take content. from 
these norms. 
C. · Identifying Relevant Principles and Policies 
There are at least two possible referents when searching for antecedents con- 4.31 
sistent with giving hostile works some degree of freedom: copyright itself, 
viewed as an isolated set of doctrines, or copyright within the context of the 
law as a whole. Let us begin with the copyright law, canvassing briefly some 
of the available principles and policies. The chapter will then turn to cognate 
areas of law, restitution and tort. 
Copyright in the USA has one dominant purpose, 'to further the progress of 4.32 . 
Science and the Useful Arts', but many subsidiary purposes are intermittently 
recognized, such as maintaining equality among different classes of authors, 
50 See paras 3.31-3.34 above. 
51 S Brand, 'Dan O'Neill Defies US Supreme Court: A Really Truly Silly Moment in 
American Law' [Spring 1979] Coevolution Q 41. 
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or honoring a perceived moral claim that authors may have in their works. 52 
It is not yet clear how the various policies should be. ranked and weighted. 
This chapter will explore this mix of purposes and ways we might resolve the 
problem this mixture poses. 
(I) Maximizing social welfare 
4.33 There are many norms by which a property system might be judged or 
justified. One type of justification is instrumental and aggregative, producing 
legal rules dictated by a social welfare function aimed at maximizing some 
particular variable. In copyright, the three most salient candidates for maxi-
mization are dollars (economic value 'as measured by ... willingness to 
pay'),53 utility, and the 'progress of science'.54 
4.34 Each of these variables has its own definitional ambiguities and internal vari-
ations, but their major deficiencies and strengths are fairly clear and familiar. 
The chief advantage of economic inquiry is that dollars are measurable; 
the chief disadvantages are that it reflects · existing distributions of wealth, 
ignores the non-monetizability of many values, and treats preferences as 
sovereign even when the preferences are perverse or mistaken. 
4.35 The strength of utilitarianism is that it treats people as equals regardless 
of wealth. Yet utility, too, (in many hands) measures nothing but simple 
52 I speak here of moral entitlements underlying conventional copyright. There is also a 
doctrine known as 'moral rights' which protects, in particular, the 'integrity' of a piece of art. 
That right, too, should be limited by free speech defences. (See paras 9.01-9.60 below.) By 
giving the holders of an integrity right a protection against distortion, 'moral rights' doctrine 
gives them a power .of manipulation. The 1.ntegrity right allows an author to say 'This is my 
symbol, my character, my image: use it only as I want you to use k If you think my use 
distorts a truth, you must find some way to address that problem without making direct use of 
my distortion.' In the USA, the integrity right is limited largely to originals.. That is, an artist 
can stop ·someone from marking up or otherwise distorting his original canvas, 17 USC, 
s 106A, or even a limited number of signed copies, but mass reproduction is outside the scope 
of the integrity right. It is submitted that this is a good compromise: when there is only one 
instantiation of a work (like the original canvas), and a choice must inevitably be made 
between artist and critic, it makes sense to honour the former more. But when a work exists in 
multiple copies, the critic's desire to use one . copy is backed by a stronger claim than the 
author's desire to eliminate criticism or mockery. 
53 See, generally, RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 9 (Little, Brown, 3rd edn, 1986). 
54 See RS Brown, 'Eligibility For Copyright Protection' (1985) 70 Minnesota L Rev 579. 
. . 
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preference, and even when preference-satisfaction is a proper goal, utility is 
difficult or impossible to measure and to compare interpersonally. 
The progress of 'science' (understood as 'knowledge') has the strength of 4.36 · 
. being, in the USA at least, the Constitutional.explanation for copyright. Yet 
progress, too, is difficult to .measure, and its use as a criterion poses an 
additional institutional difficulty: judges have been admonished by years of 
copyright jurisprudence to beware the inability of 'persons trained only to . 
the law' in evaluating cultural worth.55 
In seeking to maximize social welfare, · moreover, each of these approaches 4.37 
seems to suffer from another potential deficiency: paying insufficient atten~ 
tion to individuals. Under an aggregative inquiry, the interests of a person 
who has done nothing morally culpable can be improperly sacrificed in order 
to serve the 'greater good' (however measured). 56 
/ 
(2) Authors' rights 
The authors' rights tradition contains two strands that are commonly 4.38 
blended, 57 but that in copyright law play separate roles meriting individual 
55 Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co 188 US 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes). The 
institutional problem persists even if the 'progress ofscience' criterion could be applied to 
types of work or the system as a whole, rather than to individual works. See Mitchell Brothers 
Film Group v Cinema Adult Theater604 F 2d 852,860 (5th Cir, 1979). 
56 See U LeGuin, Those Who Walk Away from Ornelas, in The Wind's Twelve Quarters 
(Harper & Row, 1975) 224 (powerful allegory of a culture dependent on allowing harm to 
innocents). In practice, aggregative approaches may not lead to such extreme results. Mitchell 
Polinsky reminds us, for example, that persons whose interests are sacrificed in the pur~uit of 
economic efficiency can be rewarded by transfer payments after the 'larger pie' has been 
created. AM Polinsky,·An Introduction to Law and Economics (2nd edn, Little, Brown, 1983) 
7-10, 119-27. Even without transfer payments, utilitarianism can yield significant protection 
for individual interests. For example, FI Michelman, in 'Property, Utility and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law' (1967) 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 
1224, examines the US constitutional requirement that 'just compensation' be paid for 'tak-
ings' of property. That requirement is open-ended, and judges can interpret it through both 
utilitarian and fairness approaches. Michelman shows that both utilitarian and fairness. criteria 
yield significant protections for the existing property entitlements of individuals-with utility, · 
surprisingly, sometimes protecting individuals from uncompensated State action in ways that a 
pure fairness approach might not. 
57 Although these strands are usually seen as non-aggregative, they are also often inter-
twined with aggregative instrumental arguments. See, eg, D Ladd, 'The Harm of the Concept 
of Harm in Copyright' (1983) 30 J Copyright Society USA 421, 425-6. · 
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treatment. 58 One strand res_ts on the beneficial results that authors generate. 
It has to do with securing, for those who create works of value, reward for 
their 'just deserts'. It can be viewed in various ways: as a form of causation-
based corrective justice, 59 (holding that the person who creates value should 
be paid for it, just as-arguably-those who generate harm should be made 
to compensate their victims);60 as an offshoot of Lockean labour theory;61 as a 
notion of fairness; as a sort of strict liability for benefits; or as a variant of the 
law of unjust enrichment. The key notion in this branch of the so-called 
'authors' rights' or 'natural rights' tradition is the claim· to deserve some 
reward, which might take the form of a claim to control. 
4.39 The second 'authors' rights' strand has to do with an author's personal stake 
in what she has made. It too can be found in Locke, 62 though arguably only 
with some strain, and its defenders often m~e use of the work of Hegel and 
his interpreters. 63 Its proponents might emphasize that 'we have the feeling of 
our personality being in some inexplicable way extended to encompass the 
objects we own.'64 If people experience such cathexis to ordinary items of 
58 For an interesting investigation of one form that the restitutionary and personality 
approaches might take, and comparisons between them, see J Hughes, 'The Philosophy 
of Intellectual Property' (1988) 77 Georgetown L J 287. See also, AC Yen, 'Restoring the 
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession' (1990) 51 Ohio State L J 491; WJ Gordon, 
'An Inquiry Into The Merits Of Copyright: The Challenges Of Consistency, Consent, 
And Encouragement Theory', (1989) 41 Stanford L Rev 1343 at 1446-69; EC Hettinger, 
'Justifying Intellectual Property' (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 31; WJ Gordon, 
'On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse' (1992) 
78 Virginia L Rev 149-281 and WJ Gordon, 'A Property. Right in Self-Expression: 
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property' (1993) 102 Yale L J 
1533-609. 
59 See the discussion of corrective justice in WJ Gordon, 'On Owning Information: 
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse' (1992) 78 Virginia L Rev 149-281 and 
the sources cited therein. 
60
· Compare G Sher, Desert(Princeton, 1987) 69-90. 
61 See J Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (Bobbs-Merrill, 1952) ch 5. Also see 
· WJ Gordon, 'A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property' (1993) 102 Yale L J 1533 and J Hughes, 'The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property' (1988) 77 Georgetown L J 287, 296,-330. · 
62 See, eg, K Olivecrona, 'Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of 
Property' (1974) 35 J Historical Ideas 211; K Olivecrona, 'Locke's Theory of Appropriation' 
(1974) 24 Philosophical Q220, 225. 
63 See J Hughes, 'The Philosophy ofinteHectual Property' (1988) 77 Georgetown L J 287, 
330-66 and MJ Radin, 'Property and Personhood' (1982) 34 Stanford L Rev 957. 
64 K Olivecrona, 'Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property' 
(1974) 35 J Historical Ideas 21 L 
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property, then how much closer, it is thought, must be the connection of the . 
author to his creative works? Proponents of the 'personality view' might also 
argue that property contributes to 'self-actualization .... personal expression 
.. : dignity and recognition as an individual person,'65 and that control over 
one,s intellectual products is a form of property uniquely suited to these 
ends. 
Searching for a definitive ordering among these policies and principles, the 4.40 
scholar founders. The courts' statements waver, and policies interpenetrate.66 
Given this ambiguous mix of policies, with instrumentalism dominant but 
not exclusive, how should the flexible doctrines be construed? One might 
handle suppression cases by assessing the underlying policy concerns impli-
cated by each fact pattern and deciding, according to some. calculus, whe.ther 
enforcing the author's prima facie rights of control, or giving the hostile user 
the freedom to copy, best serves the relevant goals. · But, as noted above, 
determining the relevant calculus to accommodate the various goals is, at this 
stage of copyright's development, a difficult matter. This is not a sign of 
copyright's immaturity as a discipline; virtually all legal doctrines contain· a 
mix of policies competing for strength. 67 
Another way to handle the mix of policies is to minimize the conflict by 4.41 
identifying some dominant purpose. Thus, one might identify providing 
economic,. incentives as the dominant purpose of copyright, and recommend 
that special consideration be given to users whenever the copyright owner's 
motivations differ from that approved motive. But such a simplification 
threatens to distort. 
A third way of reconciling these diverse policies is to investigate whether 4.42 
· there is any result on which all relevant policies can converge. This possibility 
will now be considered. 
65 J Hughes, 'The Philosophy of Intellectual Property' (1988) 77 Georgetown L J 287, 
330 
66 For an intriguing exploration and application of several alternative policies, see 
WW Fisher III, 'Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine' (1988) 101 Harv L Rev 1659. 
67 See, eg, AA Leff, 'Law And .. .' (1978) 87 Yale L J 989 (arguing that such mixes are 
inevitable). 
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D. Safeguarding Hostile Uses from Suppression: 
A Search for Converging Policies 
4.43 & mentioned, the two major strains in copyright are the economic or 
instrumental perspective, and the authors' rights perspective. This dual 
perspective parallels the configuration in property and tort law as a 
whole,. where quandaries such as the suppression problem are sometimes 
analysed in terms of whether the individual holding an entitlement is a 
'steward' entrusted with the resource solely for the social. good that is 
likely to result from his· productive use of it, or a 'sovereign' to be left 
unregulated in managing the resource. 68 Despite their potential for conflict, 
the sovereignty and stewardship models often generate results that 
converge. 69 It may be that copyright's various normative strands can be 
similarly reconciled in regard to particular issues. It will be suggested that 
in regard to at least some suppression issues-notably, those involving 
authors who have already made the copyrighted work part of the public 
debate or consciousness70-. it may be possible to reach some consensus 
among the competing policies and principles, thus rendering it unnecessary 
. to choose one dominant strand on• which to rely. But such an analysis 
requires that one voyage soine distance beyond the explicit words of the 
copyright statute. 
68 See LL Weinreb, 'Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine' (1990) 103 Harv 
L Rev 1137, 1139-41 (implicitly addressing sovereignty and stewardship models). 
69 It is their convergence in the usual case that permits their continued coexistence as 
competing perspectives. For example, one way to serve the 'social good' is, arguably, to respect 
individual owners' investments· in their. property; compare FI Michelman, in 'Property, 
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law' 
(1967) 80 Harv L Rev 1165 (utility arguments support paying compensation to owners 
disadvantaged by government activity in a fairly wide range of instances): Similarly, a way to 
serve the economic heaith of a society is, arguably, to honour owners' decisions as to how their 
property should be used. This latter argument is, at its extreme, Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' 
notion. 
On the general notion of convergence, I am indebted to Randy Barnett. 
70 The arguments that follow apply most strongly to the . enforcement of copyright in 
published works. 
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(1) The economics of suppression 
It may seem odd to contend that second-guessing an owner's decision 4.44 
whether or not to license or sell a resource can be consistent with neoclassical 
economics. That tradition stresses the sovereignty of individual· decision-
making. However, in the suppression context, there exist many well-recog-
nized economic phenomena that should diminish our confidence that the 
owner's decisions will in fact tend toward the 'maximization of economic 
value' in any meaningful sense. Consider, for example, a historian who denies 
a hostile critic permission to quote fairly extensively from her book, or sets 
an extremely high price (say, $10,000) that she believes will be the amount 
lost in revenues if the critic's hostile review is published. Also assume that 
the review would be ineffective without the quotations. If the critic, who 
stands to make, say, $500 from the review, declines to purchase a licence but 
pubiishes the quotations nevertheless, and the historian sues, the following 
reasons counsel that the courts not assume that because the historian's price 
was higher than the critic's offer it would produce more 'value, to enjoin the 
unconsented use of the quotations rather than to allow distribution of the 
review. 
First, the critic's fee is unlikely to represent all the value that publication of 4.45 
the review will bring to the affected audience, in part because the market for 
such goods rarely if ever gives their sellers a price that captures the resulting 
surplus.71 Thus, the buyer's likely maximum offer ($499) will probably 
understate significantly the actual value of the use in her hands. 
Secondly, the historian's minimum price of $10,000 is likely to overstate 4.46 
significantly the social value of the quotations remaining solely in the his-
torian's hands, since much of that amount reflects mere pecuniary loss: if the 
review is published, many consumers of historical works will simply shift 
their purchases to other (perhaps better) historians, and there may be no net 
social loss at all. There may even be a social benefit if_ an inferior history is 
ignored and a better one supported by the reading public. 
71 See ML Katz, 'An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development' (1986) 4 Rand 
J Economics 527, 527 (in the absence of price discrimination, a firm that invests in research 
and development 'will be unable to appropriate all of the surplus generated by the licensing 
of its R&D'). Whether the historian's similar inability would exceed the critic's would be an 
empirical question. 
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· 4.47 . Thirdly, the historian's reputation and image are involved, and when such 
irreplaceable items are at· stake the very ownership of an entitlement can 
crucially change one's market behaviour. 72 When goods as important and 
irreplaceable as life or reputation are on the table, the effect of the initial 
grant of entitlements is so strong that it may well determine where the 
resource rests in the final analysis: Persons are unlikely to sell what they own 
at any price;73 yet if they have no legal entitlement to the thing at issue, their 
ability to buy it is .limited by their available resources. In such cases, the 
results of consensual bargains cannot be relied upon to yield any independent 
information about 'value'. 
4.48 · Of course, the above discussion is quite summary. Nevertheless, it should 
suggest why the copyright owner's pursuit of a non-monetary interest could 
give an economically-oriented court special reason to inquire into the weight 
of the affected interests rather than simply deferring to the plaintiffs claim of 
right. 
(2) Authors' rights andsuppression 
4.49 The authors' rights approach has, as mentioned, two principal . lines of 
argument, one resting largely on the perceived appropriateness of rewarding 
valuable labour, the· other on the perception that authors have a special 
personal attachment to their works. While~ conceivably, either of these 
strands could be employed to argue that authors should be free to suppress 
others' unfriendly use of their work, such an argument does not inevitably 
follow from the arguments' terms. To the contrary, attention to questions . 
of proper reward, or personal development and psychological cathexis, may 
better indicate that the power to suppress should not be given to artists. 
4.50 Turning first to the restitutionary strain of argument, it appears to rest on 
the notion that a person should retain the benefits that he or she generates. 
72 For further discussion of the way that owning an entitlement can shift resource alloca-
tion, see for example, EJ Mishan, 'The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive 
Essay' [1971) 9 J Economic literature I; 18-21 ('income' or 'welfare' effects illustrated 
arithmetically); see also AC Yen, 'Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
Possession' 51 Ohio State L J 518-19. 
73 Compare RH Coase, 'Notes on the Problem of Social Cost' in RH Coase, The Firm, the 
Market, and the Law (U Chicago, 1988), 157, 170-4 (suggesting that the effects of owning an 
entitlement are unlikely to be significant in contexts not involving irreplaceable goods such as, 
in this context, reputation or self-esteem). 
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That notion in turn might be traced to any one of a number of argume_nts: a 
strict view of personal responsibility, perhaps, suggesting that every indi-
vidual should keep the benefits she generates and pay for the harm she does; 
or perhaps a notion that the existing balance of goods among persons 
warrants respect as a ptima facie matter, so that any unjustified taking 
of a benefit or imposition of a harm causes an imbalance or i_nequality that 
demands recompense. But these notions do not support an unqualified plain-
tiffs right. 
Instead, they tend to be symmetrical;74 they suggest that if 'pay for the 4.51 
benefits you receive from others' is a relevant principle, so is 'do no harm to 
others', or 'pay for the harm you do others', If so, the author's right is limited 
by the very consideration that supports it.75 An author under an obligation to· 
refrain from harm is not at liberty to withdraw her work at will from the use 
of those whom it has affected. 
Another possible foundation for the restitutionary strain is the 'natural 4.52 
rights' argument is Lockean labour theory. Here, too, non-owners' rights 
against harm have an important role. A harm-based limitation on property 
rights is captured in Locke's theory by his famous 'enough and as good' 
proviso.76 
Locke argued that one who labours in the common to draw forth water from 4.53 
the lake or pick apples from the field is entitled to that to which his labour 
is joined. Modern debates have employed his theory to. suggest that an artist 
who labours to give expression to. ideas he draws from the public domain is 
similarly entitled.77 But Locke thought the ownership entitlement could only 
74 In fact, if there were an asymmetry, it would probably be to give defendants a stronger 
protection against harm than it would give plaintiffs a right · to recapture benefits. See 
S Levmore, 'Explaining Restitution' (1985) 71 Virginia L Rev 625, 671-2 (suggesting that 
such an asymmetry exists in the common law). 
75 This is the key point explored in WJ Gordon, 'A Property Right in Self-Expression' 
(1993) 102 Yale LJ1533. 
76 See J Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch 5 at para 26, 32. The condition that 
'enough anq as good' be left for others is commonly known as the 'proviso' or 'sufficiency 
condition'. · 
77 This reliance sometimes extends to claims for a perpetual and unlimited copyright. 
Such a use of Locke is particularly inapt, given his expressed views on the pre-copyright 
Licensing Act. See Peter King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London 1884) 202-09 
(memorandum from 1693 in which Locke expresses inter alia the view that rights over 
copying should be limited in time). · 
90 Part l· Mapping the Conflict 
· arise where 'enough, and as good' was left for others.78 If giving exclusive 
dominion to the labourer will leave others worse off than · they would have 
been in his absence, then the proviso is not satisfied, and the labourer is·not 
entitled to property rights in what he has taken. 
4.54 The structure of this argument gives primacy to the harm principle, as it 
should, since it can. be argued that Locke's affirmative argument also derives 
from a harm principle. To see. this, consider Locke's primary argument for 
property. 79 Locke first argues that each of us has a property in his body and 
the labour of his body. Secondly, he posits that when one appropriates things 
from the common (picking apples, drawing water from the river) one joins 
one's labour to the things so taken. Thirdly, he posits that because labour is . 
property, others have no right to what the labour is 'Joined to'. Here he is 
· implicitly building upon his earlier expressed notions of what it means to 
have 'property': it is an entitlement not to have something unjustifiably taken 
away or harmed. 80 It would harm the labourer to take the apples or water 
· from him because doing. so would take the labour he had joined to these 
items of sustenance as well. 
4.55 Therefore, one who labours to draw forth objects from the common plenitude 
'has a property' in the things so gathered, at least if there -is 'enough, and as 
good' left for others, because others are under an obligation not to harm him 
by taking the things from him. In short, Locke's labour theory may depend 
upon a 'do no harm' rule, and acting upon the theory (with no additional 
justification) is problematic when doing so itself causes harm. Suppression can 
cause harm, both in the sense of injury, and in the sense of making someone 
worse off than if they had never encountered the suppressed text. 
78 SeeJ Locke, Second Treatise ch 5 at para 26, 32; also see para 37 ('though men had a right 
to appropriate by their labour, each one to himself, as much of the things of Nature as he could 
use, yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still 
left, to those who would use the same industry'). 
79 See ibid, and the discussion in WJ Gordon, 'A Property Right in Self-Expression' (1993) 
102 Yale L J 1533. Given here is an interpretation of Locke's 'labour-joining' argument. 
Locke's Second Treatise also contains other arguments regarding, for example, the,beneficial 
results of property ownership. 
80 See J Locke, Second Treatise, ch 5. The proviso that 'enough, and as good' be left 
for others constitutes an additional 'do no harm' principle. See also LC Becker, Property 
Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Routledge & Kegan Paul, .1977) .. Similarly,· Locke's argument 
regarding waste suggests he saw hothing wrongful in taking property from someone to whom 
it had no value. J Locke, Second Treatise, ch 5 para 36-37. If so, Locke would seem to view a 
· non-harmful taking as non-wrongful, at least in the state of nature. 
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Once a copyright owner has injected something into the common culture, its 4.56 
audience may be unable to purge· it from their memories. Having changed 
the community's culture, the author may actively be committing a harm if he 
then withdraws the work from the community when its new artists seek to 
integrate, assess, and respond to its influence. Perhaps, on balance, the first 
artist's work is still more valuable than not; if so, perhaps some payment is 
owed to that first artist even when a hostile or critical use is made of his work.· 
But even if the restitutionary strain in 'natural rights' theory will justify 
complete control and injunctive relief in some circumstances, it will not do 
so here: neither an entitlement to capture the effects one creates, nor Lockean 
labour theory, supports a complete right of exclusion against those whom the 
property negatively affects. 81 Locke's property right works against those who 
are not 'industrious', those who merely desire to benefit from ''another's 
·pains'. 82 The copyist who cares about the content of the work, either positively 
or negatively, is simply not the kind of trespasser Locke envisaged. 83 
What of the 'personality' theories? Clearly the artist who finds his work 4.57 
attacked will not be happy about it. And yet a regard for emotional 
attachments or self-actualization does not point solely in the direction of 
suppression and the artist's interests; audiences, too, develop attachments to 
the symbols surrounding them, and for audiences, as for artists, use of the 
symbols may be essential to self-expression and to making an impression on 
81 For a fuller development of this theme, see . WJ Gordon, 'A Property Right in Self-
Expression' (1993) 102 Yale L J 1533; WJ Gordon, 'An Inquiry Into The Merits Of 
Copyright: The Challenges Of Consistency, Consent, And Encouragement Theory' (1989) 
41 Stanford L Rev 1343 at 1460-5. 
82 It is the proviso that 'enough and as good' be left that helps Locke identify persons who 
have a duty to respect claims to own private property. Locke writes: 
'God gave the world to men in common, but since He gave it them for their benefit and 
the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed 
He meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the 
industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it); not to the fancy or 
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improve-
ment as was already taken up needed not complain, ought not to meddle with wha,.t was 
already improved by another's labour; if he did it is plain he desired the benefit of another's 
pains, which he had no right to .. .' Locke, Second Treatise, ch 5, par 33 (emphasis 
added); 
83 Ibid. Also see WJ Gordon, 'Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives 
Seriously' 71 U Chi L Rev 75 at 78-81 ( using Locke to identify the defendants. against whom 
copyright is most appropriately used) (2004) .. 
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the world around them. 84 When the defendant seeks to deface the only copy 
of the plaintiff's work, the plaintiff's interest should probably prevail. But 
when the plaintiff's work exists in myriads of copies, it is the critic, s personal 
interest in producing her defaced, altered, or out-of-place copy-· her 'moral 
right' to do so-that seems the greater and should prevail.85 
(3) Reference to analogues in the common !tzw · 
4.58 Yet, all this is at a fairly high level of generality, and debatable. To what other 
sources might one look to determine what a lawmaker should decide when 
faced with a claimed right to suppress? One possibility is to look to decision 
makers in analogous contexts. This leads us to the common law, particularly 
the area known as substantive restitution or 'unjust enrichment'.86 This is the 
area of the common law most concerned with copyright's central issue: the 
question whether (and when) the law should impose non-contractual liability· 
for benefits one person derives from another's efforts. Persons who wilfully 
take . advantage of benefits made . possible by others, efforts are sometimes 
required to pay for them. 87 
4.59 The restitution cases, however, are marked by a strong concern with pre-
serving the defendant from an erosion of his autonomy,88 and with preserving 
84 See J Waldron, The Right to Private Property. (Oxford: OUP, 1988) 4, 343, 378~81 
(arguing that the upshot of the Hegelian analysis is that, in Hegel's own words, 'everyone must 
have property'). · · 
85 The US moral rights statute, 17 USC sec 106A, roughly follows this pattern. It 
applies only to works of visual art that exist in only one or a very few number of copies, 17 
USC sec 101 (definitions) and 106A, and the moral rights are subject to fair use, 17 USC 
sec 107. 
86 I here mean to focus on restitution that provides the basis of a cause of action, rather than 
on restitution that serves simply as a remedy for the violation of rights provided by. other 
doctrines. 
87 See WJ Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Rest#utionary 
Impulse (1992) 78 Virginia L Rev 149 (exploring the implications of restitution and unjust 
enrichment doctrine for issues concerning rights over data); WJ Gordon, 'Of Harms and 
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property' 21 J Legal Studies 449....,82 (1992) 
(comparing the exceptions to the 'intermeddler' rule,with doctrines in copyright). 
88 See GE Palmer, The Law of Restitution (Little, Brown, 197.8) 359 ('long-standing 
judicial reluctance to encourage one person to intervene in the affairs of another by rewarding 
. restitution of benefits thereby conferred.') 
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the defendant from harm. Thus, when the choice · is between leaving a 
labourer unrewarded and causing a net harm to the defendant, frequently the 
labourer is left without recourse. 89 · If the common law is any guide, then, 
authors might not be entitled to copyright's rewards in cases where copyright 
enforcement would leave the defendant suffering a net harm. If so, authors 
who attempt to use copyright law to suppress works unfavourable to them 
should not be completely free to do so. 90 Some concern for the users' auton-
omy and safety from harm-some concern with the audience's own moral 
rights-is necessary. Thus it is not merely the Lockean proviso that coun-
sels giving some latitude to th~ user who is trying to recast for herself and 
others harmful symbols and text that have been thrust upon her. 
The common law might also offer guidance to some of the other questions 4.60 
canvassed above. A particularly useful source of analogy might be torts, 
which in many ways functions as the converse of intellectual property. 91 As 
a mirror provides a great deal of information through its reversed images, 
it· may be that the literature of tort law, the civil branch of the law of 
harms, could contain significant wisdom applicable to the jurisprudence of 
benefits. 
First, both copyright and torts can be interpreted as . serving non-'- 4.61 
instrumental ends. Thus, whether using terms of morality, fairness, or 
. 'corrective justice', one can argue that an innocent victim injured by a 
harm-causer 'deserves' to be made whole and that the defendant 'ought' to . 
pay. Similarly, it is often argued that a creative person 'deserves' to be paid for 
what he has brought to the world, and that the user of another's work'ought' 
to give recompense for it. 
89 See S Levmore, 'Explaining Restitution' (1985) 71 Vrrginia L Rev 625, [77-:-8, 84] (law 
denies restitution where a non-bargained 'benefit' may not in fact make the recipient better 
off; even at a 'less-than-market' price the unsolicited benefit 'may be undesirable to a wealth-
constrained' recipient); see generally WJ Gordon, 'On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse' (1992) 78 Vrrginia L Rev 149. 
90 Of course, the desirability of avoiding harm expresses itself as a legal principle with 
weight in many other areas of the common law as well. · 
91 See WJ Gordon, 'Copyright as Tort Law's Mirror Image: "Harms';, "Benefits" and the 
Uses and Limits of Analogy' (2003) 34 McGeorge L Rev 533; WJ Gordon, 'Of Harms and 
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property' (1992) 21 J Legal Studies 449-82. 
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4.62 The question of what role should be played by a creator's claim to 'fair 
return' is largely unresolved in copyright. It is likely that there is some grain 
of truth in that much-invoked but little-analysed notion, 'the natural rights 
of an author', and only systematic analysis can separate that grain from the 
rhetoric of perpetual and all-encompassing claims that now clings to it. 
Perhaps the literature exploring· notions of 'desert' and·' corrective justice' in 
torts, and in criminal law as well, could be of assistance here. In all nations, 
tort rights have limits; not all injuries are compensable. 
4.63 Secondly,· and perhaps more importantly, both copyright and torts serve a 
particular incentive function: they seek to 'internalize externalities'. That is, 
both copyright and torts seek to bring deci~ions' effects to bear on persons 
with power to affect· how things are done. In torts, the primary person to 
be affected is the tortfeasor; he is ordinarily the 'cheapest cost avoider'· and 
is discouraged from taking unnecessary risks with others' persons and 
possessions by the spectre of a suit imposing liability for harm caused. In 
copyright, the primary person to be affected is the creator; he is ordinarily the 
· 'best benefit generator' and is to be encouraged to produce by being given a 
right to capture a portion of the benefits he creates. 92 
4.64 Thus, both doctrines aim at providing incentives. Conceivably, the lessons of 
one could be useful for the other. We might, for example, try viewing the 
creative user problem from the perspective of the tort doctrines that recog-
nize that the person best able to effectuate desirable action is not always the 
person in the defendant's position. For example, consider accident law. If a 
pedestrian is 'contributorily' or 'comparatively' negligent by running in front 
of a car, that behaviour will eliminate or reduce any recovery that might be 
sought. The economic logic is familiar: when the pedestrian is better posi-
tioned than the driver to avoid an accident,93 it is the pedestrian's behaviour 
the law should seek to change; one way to change that behaviour is to force 
pedestrians to bear some of their own costs if they choose to behave carelessly. 
4.65 The formal lesson ofthe logic is also familiar: in every transaction there are 
two parties, and deciding how to 'inter11alize' costs between them is a choice 
92 Persons with the potential to create valuable works have rights over the use others make 
of their products; the benefits the authors create are brought home via licence or royalty fees, 
and productive behaviour is encouraged. 
93 See generally G Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale, 
1970) 134-40 ('cheapest cost avoider'). 
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that should depend on context rather than on formal classifications such as 
plaintiff or defendant. 94 If all the harms that would not occur 'but for' the 
defendant's driving were internalized to· that driver, others who might 
become involved might have an inadequate incentive to be careful. 
The same lesson could be applied, just as simply, to copyright. If all the 4.66 
benefits that could be traced to a first artist through a 'but for' test were 
internalized to her, no one else would have a monetary incentive to build 
upon her work. If a creative copyist is in a better position to contribute to the 
culture than is the first artist, then perhaps the law should take care to direct 
positive incentives to such persons by, for example, giving them shelter from 
infringement suits.95 Tort tests of responsibility remind us that 'incentive' 
works both ways . 
. Similarly, tests of 'pro;x:imate cause' in tort tend to ask if the injury caused was 4.67 
of the kind that made the defendant's act negligent. Courts in copyrightcases 
should make a similar inquiry: they should ask if the plaintiffs motives for 
. suit are of the kind that made the legislature provide copyright protection in 
. the first instance. Motives to suppress were not those the legislature sought to 
further in the copyright law, and should not be effectuated through copyright 
suits.96 
E. Conclusion 
Copyright is not a self-executing concept. It must have limits to make sense. 4.68 
An unlimited copyright would give an author a perpetual right to control 
94 See RH Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 J L & Economics 1. 
95 Such shelter is especially needed when.the new author is unable to purchase a licence, but 
. is not limited to such cases. See sources cited immediately infra. 
96 See, eg, WJ Gordon, 'Fair Use as Market Failure', 82 Columbia L Rev 1600 at 1632 
(1982) (arguing that fair use may be employed to defeat anti-dissemination motives); also see 
WJ Gordon, 'Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Trans:;i.ction Costs Have Always 
·. Been Only Part of the Story' (2003) 13 J Copyright Society 149 (arguing that fair use should 
be divided into two subcategories, excuse and justification; the excuse category involves factual 
obstructions like transaction costs, while the justification category involves occasions when the 
copyright owner asserts a right that is outside the proper normative scope of her control). 
Admittedly, many cases involve mixed motives. To examine the difficult questions they pose 
would take us beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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all the benefits that others draw from her work. Such a regime would cause 
paralysis_. 
4.69 In searching for the limits that can make sense of copyright, one can make 
reference to its dominant policies, namely, incentives and authors' rights. 
One can also explore analogies in other areas of law. All these investiga-
tions converge in reminding us that sometimes encouraging the copyright 
defendant rather than the copyright plaintiff can best serve copyright's goals. 
In particular, blind copyright enforcement is particularly unwise in cases 
where the copyright owner seeks to restrain a defendant who wishes to copy . · 
for purposes of criticizing or mocking the copyrighted work. 
4.70 In some ways, this offers a distinctly American view. In our 'romance with 
the First Amendment',97 Americans honour the iconoclastic dissenter and 
critic over the person whose feelings may be hurt or whose orthodoxy may be 
weakened. But even for nations with different priorities, equitable doctrines 
such as 'fair use' can provide great benefits to individuals and the societies to 
which they belong. 
4.71 The same norms that give copyright its (contested) claim to legitimacy 
should simultaneously generate significant protections for free speech. Those 
protections may not be sufficient-they largely protect the public from harm 
from being . unable to respond to existing works that have shaped . their 
environment and their very selves, and free speech may demand mote. 
Nevertheless, if recognized and incorporated into flexible doctrines such as 
fair use, these limits could ameliorate some of the unfortunate results caused 
by the American courts' reluctance to. embrace fully the First Amendment's 
applicability to copyright. 
97 See Steven H Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy And Romance {Princeton 
University Press, 1990). 
